TY - JOUR
T1 - Incentivisation practices and their influence on physicians’ prescriptions
T2 - A qualitative analysis of practice and policy in Pakistan
AU - Khan, Mishal
AU - Rahman-Shepherd, Afifah
AU - Noor, Muhammad Naveed
AU - Sharif, Sabeen
AU - Hamid, Meherunissa
AU - Aftab, Wafa
AU - Isani, Afshan Khurshid
AU - Khan, Robyna Irshad
AU - Hasan, Rumina
AU - Shakoor, Sadia
AU - Siddiqi, Sameen
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Khan et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
PY - 2023/6/1
Y1 - 2023/6/1
N2 - Focus on profit-generating enterprise in healthcare can create conflicts of interest that adversely impact prescribing and pricing of medicines. Although a global challenge, addressing the impacts on quality of care is particularly difficult in countries where the pharmaceutical industry and physician lobby is strong relative to regulatory institutions. Our study characterises the range of incentives exchanged between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians, and investigates the differences between incentivisation practices and policies in Pakistan. In this mixed methods study, we first thematically analysed semi-structured interviews with 28 purposively selected for-profit primary-care physicians and 13 medical sales representatives from pharmaceutical companies working across Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi. We then conducted a content analysis of policies on ethical practice issued by two regulatory bodies responsible in Pakistan, and the World Health Organization. This enabled a systematic comparison of incentivisation practices with what is considered ‘prohibitive’ or ‘permissive’ in policy. Our findings demonstrate that incentivisation of physicians to meet pharmaceutical sales targets is the norm, and that both parties play in the symbiotic physician-pharma incentivisation dynamics. Further, we were able to categorise the types of incentive exchanged into one of five categories: financial, material, professional or educational, social or recreational, and familial. Our comparison of incentivisation practices with policies revealed three reasons for such widespread incentivisation linked to sales targets: first, some clear policies were being ignored by physicians; second, there are ambiguous or contradictory policies with respect to specific incentive types; and third, numerous incentive types are unaddressed by existing policies, such as pharmaceutical companies paying for private clinic renovations. There is a need for policies to be clarified and updated, and to build buy-in for policy enforcement from pharmaceutical companies and physicians, such that transgressions on target-driven prescribing are seen to be unethical.
AB - Focus on profit-generating enterprise in healthcare can create conflicts of interest that adversely impact prescribing and pricing of medicines. Although a global challenge, addressing the impacts on quality of care is particularly difficult in countries where the pharmaceutical industry and physician lobby is strong relative to regulatory institutions. Our study characterises the range of incentives exchanged between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians, and investigates the differences between incentivisation practices and policies in Pakistan. In this mixed methods study, we first thematically analysed semi-structured interviews with 28 purposively selected for-profit primary-care physicians and 13 medical sales representatives from pharmaceutical companies working across Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi. We then conducted a content analysis of policies on ethical practice issued by two regulatory bodies responsible in Pakistan, and the World Health Organization. This enabled a systematic comparison of incentivisation practices with what is considered ‘prohibitive’ or ‘permissive’ in policy. Our findings demonstrate that incentivisation of physicians to meet pharmaceutical sales targets is the norm, and that both parties play in the symbiotic physician-pharma incentivisation dynamics. Further, we were able to categorise the types of incentive exchanged into one of five categories: financial, material, professional or educational, social or recreational, and familial. Our comparison of incentivisation practices with policies revealed three reasons for such widespread incentivisation linked to sales targets: first, some clear policies were being ignored by physicians; second, there are ambiguous or contradictory policies with respect to specific incentive types; and third, numerous incentive types are unaddressed by existing policies, such as pharmaceutical companies paying for private clinic renovations. There is a need for policies to be clarified and updated, and to build buy-in for policy enforcement from pharmaceutical companies and physicians, such that transgressions on target-driven prescribing are seen to be unethical.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85175960971&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1371/journal.pgph.0001890
DO - 10.1371/journal.pgph.0001890
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85175960971
SN - 2767-3375
VL - 3
JO - PLOS Global Public Health
JF - PLOS Global Public Health
IS - 6
M1 - e0001890
ER -